



W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   2 21 11 1 
 
Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights  
and Information Sharing 
 
 




December 2008  





University of Naples Federico II 
 
University of Salerno 
 
Bocconi University, Milan 
CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS – UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES 
80126  NAPLES - ITALY 
Tel. and fax +39 081 675372 – e-mail: csef@unisa.it  
 
 




Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights  





 and Salvatore Piccolo




Multiple bank lending creates an incentive to overborrow and default. When creditor rights are poorly protected and collateral 
value is volatile, this incentive leads to rationing and non-competitive interest rates. If banks share information about past 
debts via credit reporting systems, the incentive to overborrow is mitigated: interest and default rates decrease; credit access 
improves if the value of collateral is not very volatile, but worsens otherwise. If credit reporting also allows banks to condition 
loans on clients’ subsequent debts, rationing disappears and interest rates drop to the competitive level. These predictions 
square with the findings of recent empirical studies. 
 
JEL classification: D73, K21, K42, L51 
 
Keywords: multiple-bank lending, rationing, information sharing, common agency. 
  
Acknowledgements: We are indebted to Andrea Attar, Martin Brown, Peter DeMarzo, Paolo Garella, David Martimort, Uday 
Rajan, Ilya Segal, Lucy White, the editor, and especially an associate editor and the referee for insightful suggestions. Useful 
comments were also provided by participants to the 2007 Skinance conference, the 2007 European Summer Symposium in 
Financial Markets, the CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions, the 2009 Barcelona ESEM, the 2010 
Meetings in Economics at Velia, and seminars in EIEF, EUI, Lausanne, LUISS, Milan, Paris School of Economics, Tor 
Vergata (Rome) and Zurich for their comments. A former version of this paper was circulated under the title “Information 
Sharing with Multiple-Bank Lending”. We acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of University and Research 
(MIUR) and of the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF).  
 
   Università di Salerno, CSEF and CEPR. 
   Università di Napoli Federico II, CSEF, EIEF and CEPR. Corresponding address: Department of Economics, University of 
Naples Federico II, Via Cintia, 80126 Napoli, Italy, e-mail: mrpagano@tin.it.  




1.   Introduction 
2.   The Model  
2.1.  Information sharing regimes 
2.2. The  game 
3. Incentive  compatibility 
4.  Equilibria with no information sharing 
4.1. Equilibrium  characterization 
4.2. Empirical  predictions 
5.  Equilibria with information sharing 
5.1.  Empirical predictions: effects of information sharing 
6. Extensions 
6.1.  Full information sharing and loan covenants 
6.2.  Information sharing and seniority 




















 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In most countries, ﬁrms tend to borrow from several banks: this applies to more than 85 percent
of European ﬁrms (Ongena and Smith, 2000), with even small and medium-sized ﬁrms patron-
izing several lenders (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000, and Farinha and Santos, 2002).
This pattern is also found in the United States, as shown by Petersen and Rajan (1994). These
authors document that “borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the
availability of credit” (p. 3). We argue that actual or potential multiple bank lending can have
these adverse eﬀects because it induces both borrowers and lenders to behave opportunistically,
whenever creditor rights are not well protected and the value of collateral is volatile.
When people can borrow from several banks and are protected by limited liability, they
have the incentive to overborrow: each additional dollar of debt that a borrower takes raises his
default probability vis-à-vis all lenders, thus reducing his total expected repayment. Moreover,
lenders themselves may behave opportunistically, oﬀering extra credit to their competitors’
customers while protecting their own claims via high interest rates. And customers may wish
avail themselves of this extra credit to undertake larger and less eﬃcient projects at their lenders’
expenses. To shield themselves against the contractual externalities created by both types of
opportunistic behavior, lenders may ration credit and increase interest rates.1
Our paper brings out the implications of these externalities for credit market equilibrium,
and investigates how the intensity of these externalities is aﬀected by information sharing among
lenders (credit reporting), via private credit bureaus or public credit registries. We show that,
with no information sharing and poor creditor right protection, banks will deny credit to some
applicants, and borrowers will default strategically when their collateral value is depressed. If the
value of collateral is not too volatile, information sharing improves credit market performance,
b yr e d u c i n gi n t e r e s ta sw e l la sd e f a u l tr a t e sa n db yeliminating rationing. If instead the value of
collateral is very volatile, information sharing may have the opposite eﬀect, inducing the credit
market to freeze.
In our model, customers can borrow from several banks, and can invest in a small project
or in a larger but less proﬁtable one, whose returns cannot be entirely seized by creditors. The
1In principle, multiple-bank lending may also have beneﬁcial eﬀects by allowing banks to achieve better risk
sharing and thereby oﬀer cheaper loans. For simplicity, in the analysis we abstarct from this aspect.
1fraction that cannot be seized depends on the degree of creditor protection. Borrowers’ collateral
is risky, so that they may default if its value happens to be low. Lenders cannot observe which
project is actually carried out by borrowers, so that they face a common-agency problem.2
Depending on the severity of this agency problem, three equilibrium outcomes can emerge.
First, when creditor rights are well protected, all entrepreneurs get loans at the competitive
interest rate and undertake the small and eﬃcient project. In this case, no multiple bank lending
will be observed.
Second, at intermediate levels of creditor protection, two types of equilibria may emerge.
One features rationing and strategic default: only a fraction of credit applicants are funded,
and some get loans from several banks. Interest rates are non-competitive, and new lenders do
not enter for fear of lending to overindebted entrepreneurs. The other is an equilibrium where
loans are granted at non-competitive rates, all entrepreneurs are served by a single bank, and
competitors refrain from undercutting it for fear of further opportunistic lending. While the
latter parallels the equilibrium in Parlour and Rajan (2001), the rationing equilibrium is novel
and inherently related to multi-bank lending, in contrast to that without rationing, which is
compatible with exclusive contractual relationships and multi-bank lending only plays a latent
role.
Thirdly, if creditor rights are very poorly protected and collateral values are highly volatile,
the only surviving equilibria are those with rationing or market freeze. In this region, credit
market segmentation also emerges: if the market does not freeze, diﬀerent groups of lenders oﬀer
credit at diﬀerent terms, possibly at “usurious rates” even higher than the monopoly level.
When banks share information about their clients’ outstanding debts, they can condition
their loans on the borrowers’ contractual history, and thereby better guard against opportunistic
lending. Hence information sharing expands the region where lending is oﬀered at competitive
rates and eﬃciency prevails, and eliminates rationing provided entrepreneurs’ collateral is not
too volatile. But beside this “bright side”, credit-reporting systems also have a “dark side” that
emerges when the value of borrowers’ collateral is very volatile. In this case, lenders have a
strong incentive to bet on the appreciation of collateral by providing extra loans to low-debt
2Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b) oﬀer the ﬁrst general tratment of this class of models. Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998) specialize the analysis to the case of insurance contracts, but consider a model with sequential
oﬀers. Segal and Whinston (2003), Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Martimort (2004) consider a more general
contracting space by introducing latent contracts and menus.
2customers of other banks. Credit-reporting systems may facilitate such opportunistic behavior,
allowing lenders to target more easily low-debt customers, and thus further exacerbate rationing.
However, in this area lenders never share information unless forced to do so; hence, information
sharing may be socially detrimental only if imposed by regulation.
In most of the paper, defaulted claims are assumed to be liquidated pro rata, and informa-
tion sharing concerns past obligations. However, we also extend the model to the case where
information sharing allows seniority-based liquidation, and to the case it even allows banks to
monitor the subsequent indebtedness of their clients. In both instances, the beneﬁts of informa-
tion sharing are ampliﬁed.3
Taken together, our model produces three main testable implications. First, absent informa-
tion sharing, rationing can emerge if collateral values are volatile and credit protection is poor;
this rationing is associated with high interest and default rates, consistent with the evidence from
developing countries (Mookherjee et al. 2000). Ift h ev a l u eo fc o l l a t e r a li se x t r e m e l yv o l a t i l e ,
the credit market should become endogenously segmented, with some lenders charging usurious
rates and experiencing very frequent defaults, and others charging more moderate rates and
facing less frequent defaults — a pattern often observed in rural areas of developing countries.
Second, we show that when banks share information about past debts (not merely about
delinquencies), they end up reducing default and interest rates, particularly for borrowers that
are informationally opaque and have risky collateral. These predictions square with an expanding
body of evidence, based on cross-country aggregate data (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007,
Jappelli and Pagano, 2002, Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and on microeconomic data (Brown,
Jappelli and Pagano, 2009; Galindo and Miller, 2001; Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2010, Chen
and Degryse, 2009; de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet, 2009).
Third, information sharing about past debts is predicted to increase credit access by eliminat-
ing rationing, for moderate levels of creditor protection and collateral volatility. But information
sharing may exacerbate rationing in situations where creditor rights are poorly protected and
collateral values very uncertain, as in some developing countries or more generally at times
of great turbulence like ﬁnancial crises, consistently with the study by Erzberg, Liberti and
3In particular, when information sharing also concerns subsequent debts of current clients, it leads to full
eﬃciency, being eﬀectively equivalent to exclusivity. A comparison between exclusive and non-exclusive lending
is provided by Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Attar, Campioni and Piaser (2006), among others.
3Paravisini (2008) on the extension of Argentine credit reporting coverage.
On the whole, our analysis explains why credit bureaus and registries so often pool data
about past debts and report clients’ total indebtedness to banks, rather than just reporting
past delinquencies and borrowers’ characteristics. This activity by credit-reporting systems only
makes sense in the context of multiple-bank lending. Hence, this paper complements earlier
models of information sharing in credit markets, which invariably assume exclusive lending.
These models show that sharing data on defaults and customers’ characteristics enables banks
to lend more safely, overcoming adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), or promoting
borrowers’ eﬀort to repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 1997 and 2000).4
Finally, our paper also relates to the vast literature on the determinants of credit rationing
(e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Bester (1987), among others),
which all share a common feature: rationing arises because the interest rate charged by banks is
“too low” to enable the credit market to clear but no bank attempts to raise it, fearing to worsen
the pool of loan applicants. In contrast, in our model banks react to the danger of opportunistic
lending both by rationing and by raising their rates above the competitive level, in some cases
even beyond the monopoly level. Another distinctive feature of the credit rationing due to multi-
bank lending is that it is more likely to arise when collateral value is volatile, which instead is
inconsequential in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and in the Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 introduces
the notions of incentive compatibility relevant for the characterization of equilibria. Section 4
presents the equilibria in the regime with no information sharing. Section 5 analyzes how equi-
libria change when banks can condition lending on their customers’ past indebtedness. Section
6 extends the analysis to the case in which banks can condition also on customers’ subsequent
borrowing and that in which repayments in case of default are according to seniority, under
information sharing. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
4In a sequential common agency game with adverse selection Calzolari and Pavan, 2006, also analyze the
conditions under which information sharing between principals may enhance eﬃciency.
42T h e m o d e l
We consider a set of banks  = {123} that compete by oﬀering credit to a set of risk-neutral
entrepreneurs  = {12¯ }. The interest rate at which banks raise funds is standardized to
zero. Each entrepreneur can undertake a small project or a large one, requiring an investment
 or 2 respectively. The two projects have non-stochastic revenues  and ,w i t h 
, so that the net surplus is  ≡  −  or  ≡  − 2. Due to decreasing returns, the
optimal project is the small one: ∆ ≡  −   0. Due to limited managerial capacity, each
entrepreneur can undertake at most one project.
Entrepreneurs have no resources when projects can be started, hence they must borrow.
Banks oﬀer loans for which entrepreneurs can apply sequentially. A credit contract  =(  )
issued by bank  ∈  consists of a loan  and a repayment .
The contractual environment is shaped by the following assumptions:
(A1) Hidden action. Lenders cannot verify the actual size of the borrower’s project: an entre-
preneur with a loan of size  c a nb o r r o wa na d d i t i o n a l and undertake the large project.
(A2) Limited enforcement. Borrowers are protected by limited liability and can appropriate a
fraction  ∈ (01] from the revenue of the large project, which cannot be seized by lenders
in case of default.
(A3) Uncertain future wealth. After investing, each entrepreneur receives a stochastic endow-
ment e  that equals either + or − with equal probability. We normalize its expected
value  to 1 and assume that its standard deviation  lies in the interval [01].
(A4) Costly state veriﬁcation: The realization of future wealth e  is unveriﬁable except in case
of default.
Assumptions (A1) and (A2), together with multiple-bank lending, create a moral hazard
problem: after borrowing an amount , the entrepreneur may want to borrow an additional 
and undertake the large project, so as to appropriate a share  of its revenue. This can damage
lenders, since the large project yields less than the small one and its return can be partially
appropriated by the entrepreneur. The fact that the entrepreneur can divert resources from
the large project, but not from the small one, captures the idea that the bank’s monitoring is
5less eﬀective as the project become larger and more complex. This assumption considerably
simpliﬁes the analysis without aﬀecting any of its qualitative results.
Assumption (A3) captures uncertainty about the future value of the entrepreneur’s personal
assets (e.g., his house) or about the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. This uncertainty is a novel ingredient relative
to the setting of Parlour and Rajan (2001): as we shall see, it creates scope for opportunistic
lending that is not present in their model. Most of our novel results are traceable to this new
assumption, which deeply changes the nature of banking competition. Assumption (A4) rules
out ﬁnancing contracts contingent on future wealth, and implies pure debt ﬁnancing: verifying
borrowers’ wealth is so costly as to be worthwhile only if default occurs.5
2.1 Information-sharing regimes
We will study two alternative regimes of communication between banks:
• under no information sharing, banks lending to the same borrower cannot verify either
the total indebtedness of the borrower or their own seniority;
• under information sharing, banks can verify the past indebtedness of customers and credit
applicants, that is, their total pledged repayment as well as its breakdown among creditors.
This capture precisely a common feature of credit reporting systems, which allow lenders
to interrogate credit bureaus or registers about the exposure of prospective clients only upon
receiving a loan application. This is done to prevent banks from exploiting information-sharing
systems as a marketing device.
In Section 6 we consider a more extensive form of information sharing, whereby banks can
request credit reports also after the loan application stage, in order to monitor subsequent
changes in clients’ exposure. This enables lenders to use covenants, so as to make repayments
contingent on subsequent borrowing.
All information-sharing regimes are initially analyzed under the assumption that defaulted
debts are liquidated pro rata, as often occurs for unsecured lending. In Section 5, we consider
the case in which information-sharing arrangements allow seniority-based repayment.
5This assumption is common to many contributions in the literature, for instance Bizer and DeMarzo (1992)
and Bisin and Rampini (2006). It also rules out insurance contracts with which entrepreneurs can hedge against
their wealth risk.
62.2 The game
We represent market interactions as a game in which entrepreneurs visit banks and apply for
credit sequentially (time line in Figure 1). Each bank  can oﬀer a loan contract  =(  ).
The uncertainty about entrepreneurs’ endowments is resolved at the ﬁnal stage ¯ .T oc a p t u r e
the idea that all banks are exposed to the increase in default risk due to future borrowing, there
is no last lending stage: formally, contracting between 0 and ¯  features an inﬁnite number of
stages in which banks post loan oﬀers, entrepreneurs apply for credit and banks decide whether
to grant it. For convenience, an entrepreneur can always opt out of a contract signed at stage 
by returning the corresponding loan to the lender at no cost before the investment stage ¯  +1 .
In the investment stage at ¯  +1entrepreneurs decide which investment project to undertake, if
any. If the loans granted by banks exceed the desired scale of investment, the excess credit is
returned to the respective lenders.6
[Insert Figure 1]
Banks cannot verify which investment project entrepreneurs undertake with their funding,
but can require that any loan that they grant is either invested in one of the two projects or
kept as a bank deposit at the market interest rate. The return on the investment project chosen
and the ﬁnal value of wealth e  are realized at the ﬁnal stage ¯  +2 , where loans are repaid in
full or the borrower defaults.
At every stage  ∈ N between 0 and ¯ , the sequence of events is as follows: () the bank
with the corresponding index ( = ) posts a contract ;7 () all entrepreneurs can visit it and
apply for ; () bank  =  accepts or rejects applications.8
At  ∈ N, the action of a generic entrepreneur  is ()=1if he ﬁles a loan application,
or ()=0if he does not. The action of bank  =  is a vector (()) including the
posted contract  and a sequence of replies ()=( 1()¯ ()) to each applicant, where
()= denotes an acceptance of ’s application and ()= a refusal. Entrepreneur 
6The opportunity to return unused credit at no cost reﬂects the idea that the excess loans are made available
for a very short period (between ¯  and ¯  +1 ). The role of this assumption is to guarantee eﬀective competition
between lenders: it enables entrepreneurs to apply for many loans and eventually accept only the cheapest ones.
7The case in which a bank does not post any oﬀer is captured by the convention that it oﬀers the null contract
∅ ≡ (∅ =0  ∅ =0 ) .
8The assumption that each bank can oﬀer only at a speciﬁc moment is made just to simplify the description
of its strategy. Allowing each bank to oﬀer loan contracts at diﬀerent stages would not change our results.
7and bank  =  sign a contract at stage  i fa n do n l yi f()=1and ()=
The “history” 
 known to entrepreneur  and the “history” 
 known to bank  at each date
 is what each has observed up to that date, respectively. In our setting, the description of the
past histories plays a crucial role: diﬀerent information sharing regimes are formally captured
by diﬀerent assumptions on the histories observable by banks.
Without information sharing, each entrepreneur knows his own applications and outcomes;
each bank  =  the applications received, its own acceptance decisions and the contracts
()=( 1 2 −1) oﬀered by banks before stage .9
Under information sharing, the bank receiving a loan application at stage  observes the
entrepreneur’s past indebtedness, that is, both his total pledged repayment and its breakdown








respectively; where ˜  =  and ˜  =  as long as the entrepreneur has signed  and not opted
out from this loan contract before ;w h i l e˜  =˜  =0if the entrepreneur has either not signed
 or has signed this contract but opted out from it before . When information is shared, at
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∈∈,a n dt h es e t
of possible histories by .P l a y e r s ’p a y o ﬀs depend on the realized history . However, the
actual payoﬀ of each entrepreneur only depends on his ﬁnal indebtedness (), irrespective of
the precise trading sequence  that generated that indebtedness.
The ﬁnal payoﬀ accruing to an entrepreneur with project  ∈ {} and ﬁnal wealth e  is
( e )= +m a x
©
0(1 − ) + e  − ()
ª

9Formally, at each date  ∈ N,e n t r e p r e n e u r knows the history 








{(1) (2)( − 1)} is the sequence of his applications and 

 = {(1)(2)( − 1)} is the corre-
sponding sequence of acceptance decisions by banks. Similarly, for each  ∈ N, the bank lending at stage  knows
the history 

 = { (
)()},w h e r e()=( 1() 2() ()) are the loan applications received at .I f
instead bank  is inactive up to  (which happens if ), it only knows the set of loan oﬀers by all banks, that
is, 

 = { (
)}.
8where the second term reﬂects the fact that default occurs if the realized value of pledgeable
wealth falls short of the total pledged repayment, i.e., (1 − ) + e  (). This occurs
for any history  such that agreed contracts require a total repayment (). N o t et h a tb y
assumption  =0and  = , because the entrepreneur can extract private beneﬁts only from
the large project. Since the two realizations of e  are equally likely, the expected value of the
entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is
E [( e )] =
1
2
[( − )+( + )]
Finally, the proﬁtt h a tb a n k expects from lending to an entrepreneur who undertakes a
project of size  ∈ {} and has a wealth realization e  (given the contractual history )i s :

()=E [
 ( e ) − ]
where 
 ( e ) represents the actual repayment of this entrepreneur. The size of this actual
repayment depends on whether the entrepreneur repays the loan or defaults. If the entrepreneur
repays fully, then 
 ( e )=. Otherwise, under pro-rata repayment, his pledgeable wealth is
allotted to banks proportionally to their loans, each bank being entitled to (no less than) a share
() of the debtor’s wealth. For a subset 0 of banks, the pledged repayment  may be
less than this allotted amount: these banks then only receive . Once all such banks are repaid
in full, the remaining wealth is divided among the set 00 of remaining creditors proportionally
to their loan values, that is,

 ( e )=
 P
∈00 




Since by assumption entrepreneurs can never gain from borrowing more than 2 ,w es h a l l
only characterize equilibria where entrepreneurs borrow either  or 2 and sign contracts with
at most two banks. In such equilibria, entrepreneurs’ strategies are described either by a single
loan contract or by a pair of contracts. Accordingly, we shall denote the expected utility of an
entrepreneur signing a single contract  =( ) by (∅), and that of an entrepreneur signing
contracts  =( ) and 0 =( 0) by (0). Symmetrically, we denote the expected proﬁt
9of a bank oﬀering contract  by (∅) when the borrower takes no other loan, and by (0)
where he also signs contract 0 with another bank.10
An entrepreneur’s strategy is: a sequence of loan requests, the choice of a project’s size, and
a repayment/default decision, each contingent on previous observable history. A bank’s strategy
is a sequence of contingent loans’ proposals and acceptances. Since with no information sharing
each bank does not observe the actions previously taken by its current loan applicants, the game
is one of imperfect information, so that the solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). Instead, when banks share information, the game is one of perfect information and
therefore we look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), because in this regime banks
know all relevant information about the past.
Finally, in order to simplify the analysis and focus on the most interesting and novel equi-
libria, we assume that the large project is not ﬁnancially viable, that is, it does not generate
enough pledgeable income for banks to fund it:
(A5) The large project is not ﬁnancially viable: (1 − ) − 2 +1 0.
This hypothesis only rules out equilibria with overinvestment as in Bizer and DeMarzo (1992),
where all entrepreneurs manage to fund the large project. Even if the large project is ﬁnancially
unviable, entrepreneurs may still want to carry it out solely to extract private beneﬁts at the
expense of some lenders. It is precisely for this reason that banks must worry that their oﬀers
might lead to opportunistic behavior, as explained in the next section.
3 Incentive compatibility
In our setting, eﬃciency requires all entrepreneurs to undertake the small project. This outcome
would be ensured by exclusive lending, as banks could costlessly prevent their customers from
borrowing from other lenders. But in our model exclusivity clauses are not enforceable: once
a borrower has received a loan to fund the small project, he may borrow more and switch to
the large project, so as to appropriate a fraction  of its revenue. This ineﬃcient behavior can
take two forms. First, an entrepreneur can take two small loans, each issued by a diﬀerent bank
intending to fund a single small project, and undertake the large project. Alternatively, a bank
10The formal deﬁnitions for these expressions are provided at the beginning of the Appendix.
10may deliberately design a loan contract to fund an entrepreneur who already obtained a small
loan and allow him to undertake the large project at the expenses of the ﬁrst lender. For a
market outcome to be eﬃcient, neither form of opportunistic behavior must be worthwhile.
In other words, eﬃciency requires one of the following two incentive compatibility conditions
to hold. First, each entrepreneur should not wish to apply for more than one loan, among those
oﬀered in the market. Second, whenever a given contract is oﬀered, no bank should be able
to make money by issuing another contract so as to allow the entrepreneur to undertake the
large project. The ﬁrst is a requirement on unilateral deviations by the entrepreneur, while the
second restricts bilateral deviations by a bank and an entrepreneur. Hence, we shall refer to the
two conditions as “individual” and “joint” incentive compatibility, respectively.
Our equilibrium characterization will thus rely upon the following two deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1 (Individual incentive compatibility) Given the set  of contracts oﬀered on




where ˜  =  if  is oﬀered by at least two banks and ˜  = \{} if  is oﬀered only by one
bank, and ∅ =( 0 0) is the null contract.
Condition (1) states that the utility of taking only loan  exceeds that of taking it together
with another available loan 0.T h e s e t  satisﬁes individual incentive compatibility if (1) holds
for all  ∈ . Instead, joint deviations by entrepreneurs and outside banks are prevented by:
Deﬁnition 2 (Joint incentive compatibility) The contract  is jointly incentive compatible
if there exists no other contract ˆ  such that
(ˆ ) ≥ 0 (2)
and
(ˆ )  (∅) (3)
Inequalities 2 and 3 deﬁne the conditions for proﬁtable entry by an outside bank. Our equilib-
rium characterization will rely on the notions of individual and joint incentive compatibility. The
11individual incentive constraint must hold in any eﬃcient equilibrium where several banks oﬀer
loan contracts and accept applications. For example, a zero-proﬁt equilibrium where many banks
oﬀer the perfectly competitive contract  =( ) can exist only if ( ∅) ≥ ( ).
If this individual incentive constraint is met, so is the joint incentive constraint: the latter
requires ( ∅) ≥ ( 0),w h e r e0 is oﬀered by the outside bank at a higher interest
rate than , to compensate for default risk. Otherwise, an eﬃcient equilibrium can exist if
only a single bank is active in the market and the contract it oﬀers meets the joint incentive
compatibility constraint, ensuring that outside banks will not provide further lending at its
expense.
Finally, in the equilibrium analysis developed in the following sections we impose the follow-
ing tie-breaking condition:
(A6) Tie-breaking: in any PBE a bank  prefers to lend whenever it is indiﬀerent between
lending via a jointly incentive compatible contract and not lending.
This assumption rules out uninteresting equilibria in which banks earn proﬁts by lending at
non-competitive rates and their competitors do not undercut them in the belief that their oﬀers
would themselves be subsequently undercut.
4 Equilibria with no information sharing
Two diﬀerent types of equilibria can emerge in the absence of information sharing, depending on
parameters: eﬃcient equilibria, where all entrepreneurs implement the small project, possibly
borrowing at non-competitive rates, and ineﬃcient rationing equilibria, where only a fraction of
entrepreneurs is funded, possibly at usurious rates. Rationing emerges whenever opportunistic
lending is not deterred by banks’ equilibrium behavior, so that some entrepreneurs get credit
from several banks and default strategically.
To identify the regions in which these diﬀerent equilibria arise, we focus on two key para-
meters: , the fraction of revenues that can be appropriated from the large project, and ,t h e
riskiness of entrepreneurs’ wealth. On the one hand, poor creditor protection (large ) heightens
the entrepreneurs’ temptation to overborrow and select the large project. On the other, wealth
volatility (high ) lures outside banks into inducing overborrowing, since limited liability allows
12them to shift the implied extra default risk onto the initial lender. In short, while higher values
of  increase borrowers’ individual incentives to behave opportunistically, higher values of 
increase outside banks’ gains from opportunistic lending, and therefore raises their incentives to
behave opportunistically jointly with entrepreneurs.
In Figure 2, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes for diﬀerent regions in the plane ().
The admissible parameter space is the square [01]
2,a sb o t h and  range between 0 and 1.
[Insert Figure 2]
In region , where either  or  is low, the eﬃcient project is funded at the competitive
rate: the negative externality due to multi-bank lending is absent, since the individual incentive
constraint holds when several banks oﬀer the competitive loan contract .
In region , where either  or  is larger than in region ,t h e r ei sa ne ﬃcient equilibrium
where only one bank is active and earns positive proﬁts as in Parlour-Rajan (2001), since the
fear of opportunistic lending prevents entry. In this region, the individual incentive constraint is
never satisﬁed with repayments below the monopoly level . But the joint incentive constraint
holds if the inside bank charges non-competitive rates high enough to discourage opportunistic
lending by outside banks. On the one hand, the violation of the individual incentive constraint
prevents undercutting: no outside bank lends at a rate lower than the equilibrium one, fearing
that its customers would then seek additional lending and implement the large project. On the
other hand, as the joint incentive constraint is met at the equilibrium rate, no outside bank
can induce the entrepreneur to switch to the large project. Hence, the inside bank can safely
charge a non-competitive rate — high enough to reduce the joint surplus of outside banks and
entrepreneurs, and thus deter opportunistic lending. In a nutshell, in this intermediate region
incentive problems are severe enough to prevent undercutting by competitors, but not so severe
as to make opportunistic lending by them unavoidable.
Interestingly, region  also features rationing equilibria, where several banks are active and
only some entrepreneurs receive credit. Since the individual incentive constraint is violated,
in this equilibrium borrowers seek multiple loans attempting to fund the large project. Credit
rationing, however, reduces default risk by lowering the fraction of entrepreneurs able to over-
borrow, and therefore allows some lending activity. Equilibrium obtains when interest rates and
13rationing ensure that no inactive bank is willing to enter the market, for fear of attracting too
many applicants already laden with debt.
In region ,w h e r eb o t h and  are highest, neither the individual nor the joint incentive
constraint is satisﬁed at rates lower or equal to the monopolistic repayment  = .D i ﬀerently
from region , here defaulting entrepreneurs can expropriate such a large fraction  of the large
project’s revenue that they wish to take multiple loans at any terms in order to fund the large
project, so that it is impossible to deter opportunistic lending even by charging the monopoly
rate. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs are funded, and credit
rationing becomes the only way to limit the scope for opportunistic lending. Moreover, very
large values of  also imply that opportunistic lenders, who fund the large project to induce
strategic default, need to charge usurious rates (above the monopoly level) to avoid losses.
4.1 Equilibrium characterization
In this section, we formally characterize the equilibria described intuitively so far.
4.1.1 Region 
In region , all entrepreneurs invest in the eﬃcient project and pledge the competitive repayment
 =  and several banks are active. For this equilibrium to exist, the individual incentive
constraint must hold when the contract  =(  =  = ) is oﬀered by multiple banks, i.e.




0(1 − ) + e  −  − 0ª¤
 (4)
for  = 0 = . The expression on the left-hand side of (4) is the borrower’s payoﬀ from executing
the small project and repaying , while the right-hand side is the payoﬀ that he would get by
switching to the large project: the revenue that he grabs from the project plus any residual











w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition ∆ ≡  −. The intuitive reason why in Figure 2 the ()
locus is decreasing in  is that a greater volatility of collateral value increases the attractiveness
14of the large project, by increasing the payoﬀ in the good state and making default in the bad
state more likely. Such incentive must be compensated by a stronger protection of creditor
rights, for the entrepreneur not to deviate to the large project.
As explained in Section 3, if the competitive contract  =( ) satisﬁes the individual
incentive compatibility constraint, it also satisﬁes joint incentive compatibility. Therefore, the
condition  ≤ () guarantees that in Region  there are no proﬁtable deviations from the
perfectly competitive contract.
The magnitude of this region is inversely related to the excess value generated by the small
project, ∆: the greater this diﬀerence, the weaker the temptation to switch to the large project.
The function () is decreasing in , because when their wealth is riskier, entrepreneurs gain
more by overborrowing and defaulting in the bad state. Thus, eﬃciency always prevails for ∆
suﬃciently large and  suﬃciently small. To summarize:
Proposition 1 In region  there is a unique equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs undertake
the eﬃcient project and borrow at competitive rates. This region is non-empty, and its area is
increasing in ∆ and decreasing in .
Even though for simplicity we prove this proposition with reference to the case where each
entrepreneur borrows  from one bank, in this region competitive equilibrium is perfectly com-
patible with multiple bank lending: if an entrepreneur does not wish to take extra lending after
borrowing  from a single bank, he will not wish to do so either after borrowing  from 
banks at the same rate. In other words, in region  the model does not pin down the number of
banks lending to a given entrepreneur, an indeterminacy that is standard in competitive analy-
sis. This underscores that multiple-bank lending does not per se lead to rationing, but does only
in conjunction with low creditor protection and volatile collateral values, as shown below.
4.1.2 Region 
In region  there are two possible types of equilibria: eﬃcient non-competitive equilibria with
only one active bank; and ineﬃcient equilibria where several active banks lend and ration credit,
and some entrepreneurs undertake the large project.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬃcient non-competitive equilibrium candidate. The corresponding equi-
librium contract must satisfy two conditions: ﬁrst, it must not be vulnerable to opportunistic
15lending by competing banks; second, it must not be vulnerable to undercutting.
We ﬁrst show that in the whole region  there is a set of contracts that are invulnerable
to opportunistic lending, i.e. satisfy joint incentive compatibility. According to Deﬁnition 2,
contract  is jointly incentive compatible if there is no contract 0 yielding positive proﬁts to
an entrant, when the entrepreneur signs it in conjunction with contract . A fortiori,t h i si s
guaranteed if the entrant loses money, whichever rate he charges. This is indeed the case if
the entrant induces default in both states, because the large project is not viable. Hence, the
maximal repayment 0 that the entrant can charge to an entrepreneur who already took a loan
with repayment  is the pledgeable income in the good state, net of the repayment  to the
inside bank: 0 =( 1− ) +1+ − . Hence, contract  deters opportunistic entry if the













As (0) is decreasing in the rate  of the inside bank, the latter can always deter entry
via a high enough repayment, provided condition (6) holds at least when the inside bank charge
the monopoly repayment  = . Therefore, inequality (6) evaluated at  =  deﬁnes the the
region where at least the monopoly contract  =( ) is jointly incentive compatible:










Figure 2 shows that the function  () is weakly increasing in , since greater collateral
volatility increases the proﬁts of opportunistic entrants: this must be compensated by a higher
, i.e. worse creditor protection, which tends to lower the entrants’ proﬁts.
However, even when condition (7) is not met, joint incentive compatibility may still hold if
entrepreneurs are not willing to take the loans that an opportunistic entrant can proﬁtably oﬀer
them. Formally, this occurs if the entrepreneur’s utility from accepting only the inside bank’s
contract  exceeds that from taking also the zero-proﬁt contract 00 oﬀered by the entrant:
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Since the entrepreneur’s gain from taking only the contract of the inside bank is maximal when
this contract requires the competitive repayment  = , joint incentive compatibility holds if (8)
and (9) are both satisﬁed for  = ,n a m e l yi f


















To summarize, joint incentive compatibility is satisﬁed either if  ≥  () or if  ≤ 0().
Graphically, we must be above the weakly increasing locus  () or below the weakly decreasing
0() function. Thus 0 () is constant and equal to ( +1 )  if 1  3∆;o t h e r w i s e ,i ti s
constant up to  =3 ∆ and decreasing for 3∆. Since the equilibrium characterization
is qualitatively the same in the two cases, from now on we shall only consider the case where
1  3∆.
Region  is the area where joint incentive compatibility holds but the competitive equi-
librium does not exist because the individual incentive constraint is violated, i.e.  ().
Intuitively, the fact that some contracts satisfy joint incentive compatibility implies that the
inside bank succeeds in protecting itself against opportunistic lending. However, for such non-
competitive contracts to survive in equilibrium, they must also be immune to undercutting. We
show that for some of these contracts this is indeed the case, because undercutters are themselves
exposed to the danger of opportunistic lending or to the risk that their loan is taken together
with that of the incumbent:
Proposition 2 In region , there is a continuum of non-competitive equilibria (each with a
diﬀerent repayment  ) where a single bank is active, earns positive proﬁts and funds the
eﬃcient project by oﬀering the loan  to all entrepreneurs. This region is non-empty.
This result is reminiscent of that by Parlour and Rajan (2001), with the diﬀerence that in
11The zero-proﬁt repayment that solves this condition never induces default in the good state, since below the
frontier  () the entrepreneur’s own wealth in the good state is by construction large enough to guarantee that
he can fully repay 
00 even when the incumbent charges the monopoly rate.
17their setting joint incentive compatibility holds by assumption12, so that undercutting is not
restrained by the danger of further opportunistic lending by outside banks. In this sense, in our
model the scope for non-competitive behavior by the incumbent is even larger.
Region  also features a novel type of equilibrium, where several banks are active and
some entrepreneurs are denied credit. These symmetric rationing equilibria share the following
features. First, entrepreneurs apply to all active banks, hoping to obtain loans from at least two
banks, since individual incentive compatibility is violated. Second, banks accept applications
randomly, so that in equilibrium some entrepreneurs receive no credit, some manage to obtain
a loan of size  and others of size 2. An active bank earns  −  on each client who is granted
a single loan, and loses money on those who get two loans of size  and default in the bad
state. Therefore, each bank’s expected proﬁt is decreasing in the number of loans oﬀered by
competitors. The fraction of accepted loan applications is such that each bank just breaks even.
In region , this rationing equilibrium is the only one consistent with multiple active banks:
Proposition 3 In region  there are zero-proﬁt symmetric equilibria with rationing, where only
a subset of banks is active and each oﬀers a single loan contract to a fraction  of entrepreneurs.
In this region there is a continuum of such equilibria, each associated with a diﬀerent repay-
ment and a corresponding lending probability. For simplicity, we analyze the case where only
two banks are active, but it can be shown that a continuum of rationing equilibria exists for
any number of active banks. The idea behind all these rationing equilibria is that no bank can
proﬁtably deviate from its loan policy by accepting additional applicants, in spite of the presence
of rationing: the number of applications accepted in equilibrium by competitors (the fraction
) implies that each bank’s prospective customers are too risky to warrant further lending.
To sharpen our empirical predictions, we explore how the equilibrium fraction of funded
entrepreneurs, , varies with the equilibrium repayment and default probability across equilibria:
Proposition 4 Rationing equilibria where a larger fraction  of entrepreneurs obtains credit
feature a higher contractual repayment  and higher default probability.
12As Parlour and Rajan explain, in their framework “the lenders will never want to induce default,....Hence,
any contract oﬀered by a lender will, in a pure-strategy equilibrium, satisfy the borrower’s incentive (or no-
default) constraint”. Thus, in their model the violation of the individual incentive constraint is the only source
of contractual externalities.
18Intuitively, the equilibria where more entrepreneurs get credit also feature a higher proba-
bility that each of them gets two loans and defaults. To compensate for the resulting increase
in losses, each bank requires higher contractual repayments.
4.1.3 Region 
Region  is where moral hazard problems are most severe: the fraction of surplus that borrowers
can steal is so large and collateral value so volatile that opportunistic lending may never be
deterred, even by charging the monopoly rate. Technically, there is no contract that satisﬁes
joint incentive compatibility. This occurs when 0()   (). A sar e s u l t ,i nt h i sa r e a
no equilibrium exists in which all entrepreneurs obtain credit. Here, either there is rationing, in
the sense that not all credit applicants obtain a loan, or else the credit market freezes, meaning
that no bank posts oﬀers, so that no entrepreneur is funded.
The rationing equilibrium in this region diﬀers from that in region :a tl e a s tt w od i ﬀerent
contracts must be oﬀered, one charging a “usurious repayment”  above the monopoly level
 = , and the other requiring the monopoly repayment. The repayment  is the maxi-
mum that an entrepreneur who already borrowed at the monopolistic rate can pledge without
defaulting in the good state. As shown in the Appendix,  =( 1− )+1+−   = .
Proposition 5 In region , there are both a competitive equilibrium with rationing and an
equilibrium with market freeze. In the rationing equilibrium, banks accept a fraction of loan
applications such that each loan application yields zero expected proﬁts. Some banks oﬀer the
monopoly contract  =
¡
¢
and others the usurious contract  =( ).T h i sr e g i o ni s
non-empty if and only if ∆  2.
In the rationing equilibrium, entrepreneurs apply for both the monopoly and the usurious
loan: some get no loan, some get one at the monopoly rate, others get both the monopoly and
the usurious contract, and the rest take two contracts at the usurious rate. A bank issuing a
monopoly loan earns proﬁts on the clients who take no other loan, and makes losses on those
who take another loan. A bank lending at usurious rates makes proﬁts on clients who signed
the monopoly contract with a competitor, and losses on those with another usurious contract.
In equilibrium, usurers receive more applications from entrepreneurs who will eventually default
19than non-usurers, but charge correspondingly higher rates, as both types of lenders break even.
This credit market segmentation is often observed in rural areas of developing countries.
T h er e a s o nw h yt h e r em u s tb es o m eb a n k so ﬀering loans at usurious rates is as follows. First,
in this region the value of collateral is so volatile. that even the monopolistic contract does not
satisfy the joint incentive constraint; second, creditor protection is so poor that an outside bank
lending to an entrepreneur who has already accepted a loan at the monopoly rate must charge
more that the monopoly rate; third, entrepreneurs are willing to take loans at such a high rate
because the usurious loan allows them to appropriate part of the large project’s return, while
by defaulting they avoid paying these high rates in the bad state.
4.2 Empirical predictions
The model of multiple bank lending developed so far has two main empirical predictions: a novel
one regarding the eﬀect of the volatility of collateral value, and another concerning creditor rights
protection which is broadly in line with the literature.
The novel testable prediction is that multi-bank lending entails credit rationing only if the
value of collateral is suﬃciently volatile: as  increases in Figure 2, we move from competitive
equilibrium to an equilibrium with rationing and high interest and default rates. This eﬀect
does not arise in single-bank models of credit rationing, such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), Williamson (1987) and Longhofer (1997), where increases in the volatility
of collateral are neutral. The prediction is that rationing should be more widespread in coun-
tries where real estate prices are more volatile and in industries with more unstable secondary
market collateral values. By the same token, credit rationing should be more pervasive when
the instability of house prices is more pronounced, as in the recent subprime loan crisis.
The model also predicts that improving creditor protection — lowering  in Figure 2 — tends
to reduce credit rationing and raise competition. If borrowers’ wealth is not very volatile (low ),
strengthening creditor rights shifts the economy from region  to region , thereby improving
credit access and lowering default rates. If instead in region  t h em a r k e tf e a t u r e san o n -
competitive equilibrium, a shift to region  implies more intense banking competition and lower
interest rates. If borrowers’ wealth is very volatile (high ), better creditor protection may shift
the economy from region  to , that is, from rationing to a non-competitive equilibrium where
20all entrepreneurs are served. In summary, the model predicts that creditor-friendly reforms
increase credit availability, as in the above-mentioned models of credit rationing, and reduce
default and interest rates by fostering banking competition, as in Parlour and Rajan (2001).
These predictions are consistent with cross-country data and with U.S. data on interstate
diﬀerences in bankruptcy law. La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007) show that the
breadth of credit markets is positively correlated across countries with measures of creditor rights
protection. Along the same lines, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) ﬁnd that households living in
states with comparatively high exemptions are more likely to be turned down for credit, borrow
less and pay higher interest rates; and White (2006) shows that debt forgiveness in bankruptcy
harms future borrowers by reducing credit availability and raising interest rates.
Figure 3 shows that both of the two key parameters discussed so far vary considerably across
countries. The ﬁgure plots on the horizontal axis the standard deviation of real house price
changes between 1970 and 2006, as a proxy of collateral volatility , and on the vertical axis an
inverse measure of creditor rights protection, as a proxy of the fraction  of revenues that cannot
be pledged to creditors.13 According to the model’s prediction, absent information sharing,
countries such as Finland, Italy and Spain are those where multi-bank lending is most likely
to lead to credit rationing, high defaults and interest rates, as they feature both comparatively
large collateral volatility and poor creditor right protection. The opposite applies to countries
with excellent creditor protection such as the U.K. and New Zealand, or low collateral volatility
such as Germany.
[Insert Figure 3]
5 Equilibria with information sharing
We now turn to the case where banks share information on entrepreneurs’ borrowing histories,
and in particular on their total exposure. This form of information sharing, which is widespread
in credit markets, helps banks to guard against the risk of default, by conditioning loan oﬀers
on the applicants’ ﬁnancial exposure.
13The choice of countries is dictated by the availability of comparable data for real house prices. The Bank
of International Settlements provides such data for the 18 countries in the ﬁgure. Creditor rights protection is
drawn from Djankov et al. (2007). Since the latter ranges between 0 and 4, the inverse measure plotted in the
ﬁgure equals 4 minus the Djankov et al. indicator.
21As in the previous section, we continue to assume that creditors recover on a pro-rata basis
in case of default. Natural enough in markets with no information sharing, where no lender
knows customers’ past indebtedness, such an assumption may be questionable when information
sharing makes each lender aware of his seniority. Nevertheless, pro-rata liquidation occurs even
in countries where credit bureaus are widespread. For instance, in the U.S. consumer credit
market, the assets of defaulting borrowers (above a minimum threshold) are liquidated pro-rata
under Chapter 7 (Parlour and Rajan, 2001). Retaining pro-rata liquidation also facilitates the
comparison with the no information sharing case analyzed so far. The extension to seniority-
based liquidation is left to Section 6.2.
The eﬀects of information sharing are illustrated in Figure 4. A comparison with Figure 2
shows that information sharing changes the equilibrium conﬁguration by shifting the boundaries
between regions from the dashed lines (the boundaries in Figure 2) to the solid ones. Moreover,
information sharing eliminates rationing equilibria. The intuitive reason why rationing equilibria
disappear with information sharing is that such equilibria are sustained by randomization across
loan oﬀers and refusals. With information sharing, the uncertainty about how many contracts
entrepreneurs have already signed vanishes, so that the scope for rationing also disappears.
[Insert Figure 4]
Speciﬁcally, the eﬃcient and competitive region expands, from region  in Figure 2 to 0 in
Figure 4. Now in the area between the dashed line () a n dt h es o l i dl i n e0 (), borrowers eager
to switch to the large project can no longer obtain an additional loan at the competitive rate,
because banks can refuse lending to borrowers who have already taken a loan and because outside
banks cannot proﬁt from opportunistic lending (joint incentive compatibility being satisﬁed in
this area). As they no longer fear entrepreneurs playing them one against another, banks are
now willing to oﬀer loans of size  at the competitive rate in equilibrium.
Moreover, in area 0 all non-competitive equilibria disappear, because information sharing
allows outside lenders to safely undercut incumbents: starting from a non-competitive equi-
librium candidate, any bank can now oﬀer a better rate to any entrepreneur who is not yet
indebted. This highlights the pro-competitive eﬀect of information sharing.
As e c o n de ﬀect of information sharing is that rationing equilibria disappear in area .T o
see why, recall that absent information sharing, in region  some entrepreneurs take two loans
22at a rate above the competitive level and default. With information sharing, instead, banks can
identify any entrepreneur who has not yet received credit and target him with a loan oﬀer. In
doing so, they can be conﬁdent that no competing bank will grant a second loan, anticipating
that the double borrower would default and inﬂict losses on both lenders.
The two eﬀects just described — expansion of the competitive and eﬃcient region, and removal
of credit rationing — underscore the positive side of information sharing, its tendency to enhance
eﬃciency by mitigating the contractual externalities of non-exclusivity. To summarize:
Proposition 6 Under information sharing, the region with a unique, eﬃcient and competitive
equilibrium expands from  to 0. This region is non-empty and for ∆coincides with
the whole parameter space [01]
2.I nr e g i o n0 ⊂  there is a unique non-competitive equilib-
rium with no rationing. The corresponding equilibrium repayment is the lowest among all the
equilibrium repayments that obtain in region  without information sharing.
Information sharing may also have a dark side, however. This emerges in region 0 (which
coincides with region  in Figure 2). Here too, rationing disappears, but information sharing
induces a unique equilibrium with market freeze. Indeed, in this region neither the individual
nor the joint incentive constraints are met, so that already funded entrepreneurs are willing to
take additional loans at the expenses of the non-usurious lenders, and outside banks are willing
to oﬀer them credit (as they expect to recover their money at the expense of the non-usurious
lenders). Absent information sharing, even usurers must worry about the risk of lending to a
customer already indebted with another usurer: since the large project is not viable, in this
area two usurers dealing with the same client lose money. In equilibrium, this limits lending
at usurious rates. With information sharing, instead, usurers can easily target all clients not
indebted with other usurers. In so doing, they make lending unproﬁtable for any bank charging
lower rates, and thereby cause the entire loan market to freeze :
Proposition 7 In region 0 there is a unique equilibrium with market freeze.
It may seem paradoxical that in region 0 information sharing reduces eﬃciency even though
it mitigates contractual externalities. The point, however, is that in this region contractual
externalities between usurers were beneﬁcial in the absence of information sharing: banks lending
23at usurious rates had to worry about customers playing them one against the other, which
kept them from competing too aggressively against non-usurious lenders. Information sharing
dispenses them from this concern, but their more aggressive lending strategy kills oﬀ the market.
5.1 Empirical predictions: eﬀects of information sharing
Our results oﬀer a number of testable predictions on how information sharing about past in-
debtedness should aﬀect credit market performance. First, information sharing unambiguously
reduces default and interest rates in active markets, and more so in countries with worse cred-
itor protection and riskier collateral or, within a given country, for informationally opaque and
riskier borrowers. Second, eliminating rationing should result in smaller individual loans. Third,
when lenders spontaneously share information about past debts, credit availability invariably
increases. If instead banks are forced to share information, credit supply will increase if the
variability of collateral is not too large, because it will shift the economy from a an equilibrium
with rationing to a situation with no rationing. However, if poor creditor protection is coupled
with high uncertainty on the value of borrowers’ collateral, mandatory information sharing re-
duces credit availability, by leading to a market freeze. This “dark side” of credit reporting may
be relevant in some developing countries, where potential borrowers are farmers with very risky
wealth, while lenders often charge usurious rates. In such environments, information sharing
would enhance the usurers’ ability to target clients, and so disrupt the viability of lending at
non-usurious rates.
An expanding empirical literature, based on cross-country aggregate data (Djankov, McLiesh
and Shleifer, 2007, Jappelli and Pagano, 2002, Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and on ﬁrm-level data
(Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009; Galindo and Miller, 2001) has showed that information
sharing is associated more lending and/or lower delinquencies. In particular, Doblas-Madrid
and Minetti (2010), who explore contract-level data from a major U.S. credit bureau, ﬁnd that
as lenders enter the bureau, they experience a decline in borrowers’ delinquencies, and more
so for informationally opaque and riskier clients. They also ﬁnd that access to the bureau
induces creditors to grant smaller individual loans, in line with our model’s prediction. Chen
and Degryse (2009), who analyze household lending by a major Chinese bank, ﬁnd that the
bank grants a larger credit line to borrowers for whom it receives extra information from other
24ﬁnancial institutions, and that its lending decisions are aﬀected by data about lending by other
banks, as assumed in our model, rather than about past delinquencies. A randomized experiment
on a Guatemalan microﬁnance lender who gradually started using a credit bureau, conducted
by de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet (2009), leads to broadly similar results: recourse to the
credit bureau allows increased volume and eﬃciency of lending, with no increase in defaults.
In terms of our analysis the expansion of lending associated with information sharing may
be interpreted as an indication that in most instances information sharing reduces incentives
for opportunistic lending, just as the improvement in legal protection of creditors discussed
in Section 4.2. This “substitutability” relationship between information sharing and creditor
protection is consistent with the evidence of Djankov et al. (2007) and Brown et al. (2009).
Indeed, turning back to Figure 3, it is precisely in some of the countries with weaker creditor
protection (France) or higher collateral volatility (Italy and Spain) that public credit registers
provide to banks the amount (as well as the maturity) of all the loans granted to each borrower.14
Finally, the “dark side” of information sharing identiﬁed by our analysis may help to interpret
the evidence in Herzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2008), that the extension of Argentina’s public
credit register to loans below the $200,000 threshold in 1998 resulted in lower lending and
higher default rates, for ﬁrms that borrowed from multiple lenders. This evidence accords with
the eﬀect of the introduction of information sharing in our rationing equilibrium when the
uncertainty about collateral value is very high and creditor rights poorly protected. Both of
these prerequisites apply in the case at hand: not only Argentina scores quite low on creditor
protection according to the Djankov et al. (2007) indicator, and the 1998 extension in the credit
register took place soon before Argentina plunged in the worst crisis of its postwar history.
6E x t e n s i o n s
So far, our analysis has proceeded under two simplifying assumptions: ﬁrst, in the informa-
tion sharing regime banks can only use retrospective information on their credit applicants’
indebtedness; second, liquidation of defaulted loans is pro rata. Now, we show that when either
assumption is relaxed, the beneﬁcial eﬀects of information sharing are ampliﬁed.
14This information is drawn from Miller (2003). The only other countries in Figure 3 where public credit register
disseminate loan information are Belgium and Germany, but in the latter it only applies to very large loans.
256.1 Full information sharing and loan covenants
The information sharing system described in Section 5 does not allow banks to monitor the
subsequent credit exposure of its customers. However, one may envisage a situation in which
banks use a credit register to check exposures even after lending. This regime, that we label
“full information sharing”, is equivalent to a situation where exclusive contracts are enforceable:
banks can impose loan covenants that force early liquidation and repayment if total indebtedness
exceeds a speciﬁed threshold before the investment is made. In this case, it is immediate that
there is a unique eﬃcient and competitive equilibrium for all parameter values.
However, in reality covenants are costly to enforce; moreover, lenders may become aware of
their violation after the investment stage. In both cases, full information sharing can be shown
to be equivalent to the regime described in Section 5.
6.2 Information sharing and seniority
To this point, defaulted debts were assumed to be liquidated pro rata. But the creation of a credit
reporting mechanism facilitates the seniority ranking of creditors, thus allowing the enforcement
of seniority-based liquidation in case of default. For instance, the land registries used to record
mortgage claims — the ancestors of modern credit reporting systems — served the dual purpose
of enabling lenders to verify the residual collateral of credit applicants and of documenting the
seniority of their claims (Hoﬀman et al., 1998, 1999 and 2001). Accordingly, we now explore
what happens in a credit market with information sharing if the liquidation rule shifts from pro-
rata to seniority. As we shall see, information sharing beneﬁts more credit market performance
when it is used jointly with seniority-based (rather then pro-rata) liquidation.
Seniority-based liquidation changes the deﬁnition of bank ’s expected proﬁt

( e )=E [
( e ) − ]
Now in case of default the actual repayment 
( e ) to bank  equals (1−)+ e −(),
i.e. the debtor’s pledgeable wealth minus the repayments to senior creditors, ()=
P
0 0,
if positive. For instance, with only two lenders 2()=1,w h e r e1 is the repayment to the
senior bank 1. Clearly, the junior bank 2 appropriates a smaller share of the borrower’s assets
26than under pro rata liquidation, which weakens the temptation to lend opportunistically.
As a result, the locus 0() of Figure 4, below which all entrepreneurs invest in the eﬃcient
project and pledge the competitive repayment , is replaced by 00() in Figure 5. As before,
this locus is deﬁned by the incentive compatibility condition (8), which remains unaﬀected, and
the zero-proﬁt condition E [(0 e )] = 0 of the junior bank, which now must take into account
its weaker seniority rights. Precisely for this reason, the junior bank must now charge more to
break even, so that the entrepreneur’s incentive to seek additional credit weakens: opportunistic
lending will occur for larger values of  or/and , so that the locus 00() lies above 0().15
Therefore, the competitive and eﬃcient region expands from region 0 in Figure 4 to 00 in
Figure 5. Part of this expansion comes at the expense of non-competitive region 0,w h i c h
shrinks to region 00, and part at the expense of the market freeze region from 0 to 00.
[Insert Figure 5]
Moreover, the  () locus of Figure 4 is replaced by the lower locus 0
 () in Figure 5.
This is because seniority-based liquidation oﬀers better protection against opportunistic lending
to the claim of a senior bank oﬀering a small loan, so that non-competitive equilibria occur in a
larger region of the parameter space [01]2.S or e g i o n0, where banks charge non-competitive
rates, expands at the expense of region 0.
Summarizing, these shifts enlarge the region where the small and eﬃcient project can be
funded (from 0 ∪ 0 to 00 ∪ 00), and also the region where it can be funded at competitive
terms (from 0 to 00). Both of these shifts compress the region where information sharing
triggers market freeze, from 0 to 00: seniority-based liquidation, by better protecting senior
creditors, leaves less scope for usurious lending, which is responsible for market freeze — a result
that echoes Bisin and Rampini (2005).
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
When people can borrow from several banks, lending by each bank increases the customer’s
default risk. We show that the strength of this contractual externality depends on creditor rights
15It can be shown that the 
00() locus is decreasing in  and has the same slope 1 as the locus 
0() in
Figure 3.
27protection and on the volatility of collateral values. When creditor rights are well protected, the
externality is absent or tenuous, so that banks can lend at competitive rates without fearing that
their customers will take additional loans. When creditor protection is in an intermediate range,
this externality generates equilibria with non-competitive rates and possibly credit denial to
some applicants (rationing). When the value of collateral is suﬃciently volatile, the equilibrium
always involves rationing and even usurious rates by some lenders.
For moderate levels of creditor protection and collateral volatility, information sharing about
past debts mitigates these contractual externalities by allowing banks to condition their loans
on the borrower’s contractual history, so to guard themselves against opportunistic lending by
competitors. As a result, it increases access to credit by eliminating rationing. However, in
situations where creditor rights are poorly protected and collateral values very uncertain, infor-
mation sharing may exacerbate rationing and even induce market freezes: this may be relevant
for some developing countries or more generally at times of great turbulence, like ﬁnancial crises.
Our model has three main testable predictions. First, credit rationing should be tighter, and
interest and default rates larger when collateral is risky and creditor rights are poorly protected.
Second, information sharing about past debts should reduce default and interest rates. Third,
information sharing should increase credit access, unless collateral values are very volatile. These
three predictions are largely consistent with the existing empirical evidence.
28Appendix: Proofs
Throughout the proofs, we characterize credit market equilibria where any active bank oﬀers
only loans of size . Consistent with the notation introduced in Section 2, the utility that an
entrepreneur obtains if he signs both contracts  =( ) and 0 =( 0) is




0(1 − ) + e  −  − 0ª¤

and the expected proﬁt of a bank oﬀering contract  to an entrepreneur who also signs 0 with
another bank is
(0)=E  [min{ (e )}] − 
with e  ∈ { −  + },a n d
(e )= if (1 − ) + e  − 0 − 0
=m a x
½
(1 − ) + e 
2
(1 − ) + e  − 0
¾
otherwise.
We denote by  =( ) and  =( ) the contracts requiring the perfectly competitive
and the monopolistic repayments, respectively. Moreover, we refer throughout to  () as the
set of contracts issued up to stage ,w h i l e ∈ [01] is the fraction of applications for  that
bank  would accept, according to competitors’ equilibrium beliefs, after issuing .W e w i l l
assume that all players have common beliefs.
Finally, to simplify the description of entrepreneurs’ strategies, we assume without loss of
generality that each entrepreneur applies for all contracts. Note that this is a weakly dominant
strategy since entrepreneurs can opt out of a contract at any stage before .
The following lemma will be used to prove Proposition 1. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h el e m m as t a t e s
that the entrepreneur may beneﬁt from taking two loans only if he defaults in the bad state.
The second part identiﬁes the region in which the entrepreneur takes two loans with the same
rate, if available, i.e. the region where individual incentive compatibility does not hold.
Lemma 1 The following properties hold:
() Consider any pair of contracts  =( ) and 0 =( 0),w i t h0 ≥  ≥ .T h e n(0) 
(∅) only if (1 − ) +1−  −  − 0  0.
() Consider any contract  =( ) such that  ∈ [] and 2(1 − ) +1− .T h e n










Proof. The proof of part () follows immediately from the fact that the NPV of the small
project exceeds that of the large one. As for part (), straightforward calculations imply that
29() solves




max{0(1 − ) +1+ − 2} − ( +1− )=0 
This implies the result, since () − (∅) is increasing in . ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst prove existence and then uniqueness.
Existence. Consider the candidate equilibrium where () all banks issue the contract  and
extend credit to all applicants for any possible  (); () each entrepreneur takes a loan 
by randomizing with equal probability among the banks oﬀering his most preferred contract,
and undertakes the small eﬃcient project; () at each stage , banks’ beliefs are that their
competitors accept all applications, i.e.  =1 for any possible  and  ().
Conditions ()-() identify a PBE. Indeed, entrepreneurs’ strategies are sequentially rational
given () and (), since the individual incentive constraint ( thereafter) is satisﬁed for  ≤
() b yL e m m a1 ,s ot h a t( ∅) ≥ ( ). Moreover, banks’ strategies are sequentially
rational (given the common beliefs on competitors’ acceptance policies) since no bank can earn
positive proﬁtb yo ﬀering 0 =( 00) 6= . Indeed, the  condition guarantees that no
entrepreneur will ever sign a contract 0 =( 00) such that 0 under the beliefs ().
Uniqueness. We must show that for  ≤ () there exists no equilibrium where a contract
 =( ),w i t h , is taken by any entrepreneur. The condition  ≤ (), together
with the continuity of the entrepreneurs’ expected utility, implies that (00 ∅)  (00),w i t h
00 suﬃciently close to ,a n d 00. As a consequence, Assumption A6 guarantees that if
 is not oﬀered, any bank can proﬁtably deviate by oﬀering 00. Indeed, this contract makes
positive proﬁts if accepted by any entrepreneur. Therefore, a necessary condition for contracts
charging non-competitive rates to be signed in equilibrium by some entrepreneurs is that all
banks earn positive proﬁts. But if so, then by assumption A6 some bank will undercut its
competitors. hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, region  is non-empty since ()  0 at  =1 ,s ot h a t()  0 for all . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Let us ﬁrst introduce a deﬁnition and some new notation. Let us
denote by  the set of contracts that satisfy joint incentive compatibility, and by  the subset
of contracts in  that cannot be undercut by any other contract in ,t h a ti s :
 ≡
©
 =( ): ≤  =  ∈ , (e ) ≥ (e ∅) ∀ e  ∈ 
ª

The subset  is non-empty in region  (where  is non-empty) because in this area any
contract with rate  ≥  =  does not satisfy the individual incentive constraint. Hence, the
inequality
(e ) ≥ (e ∅) ∀ e  ∈ 
30must be satisﬁed by the contract with the lowest repayment in . We shall denote by
∗ =( ∗) and ∗∗ =( ∗∗),w h e r e∗∗  , the contracts with the minimal and maximal
repayment in , respectively. Note that by deﬁnition ∗ =  whenever  is jointly incentive
compatible, which is true for  6 0 ().
We shall prove that in region  there is a PBE where only one bank is active, oﬀers ∗∗ and
accepts all applications for this contract. By using the same logic, one can show that, for any
 ∈ ,i nr e g i o n there exists a PBE where only one bank oﬀers  and accepts all applications
for this contract, while other banks are inactive.
Next, we prove the preliminary result that if bank 1 has issued contract ∗∗ and bank 2
tries to undercut it by requiring a repayment below ∗, then there is always a bank 3 that can
issue a contract  such that both banks 2 and 3 make zero expected proﬁts. Let  =( )
be the contract that earns zero proﬁts if an entrepreneur taking this contract and undertaking
the large project defaults only in the bad state, i.e., ()=0for  =( ),w i t h ∈
((1 − ) +1−  − (1 − ) +1+ − ] and  . Then:
Lemma 2 For any  =( ) with  ≤  ∗,a n d =( ) with   , such that
( )=( ∅), there is a couple (˜ ) ∈ (01)2 that solves:
˜ ()+( 1− ˜ )( ∗∗)=0  (A1)
()+( 1− )(∅)=0  (A2)
Proof. Equation (A2) holds for some  ∈ (01) since ()  0 because the large project is
not viable, and   ,w h i l e( ∅)  0 since   . Similarly, ˜  solves (A1) since  ∈ 
and  imply ()  0, while ( ∗∗)  0 because the large project is not viable, and
  ∗∗. ¥
Now let e ()=(  ˜ ()) be the contract with the lowest repayment in  () and let
b () denote the ﬁrst contract with a repayment lower than ∗, which is issued before .W e
shall prove that the following strategies and beliefs describe a PBE:
Equilibrium strategies:
(1) Either if ()=∅,o ri f() 6= ∅, ˜ () ≥ ∗ and neither ∗∗  ∈  () nor 
 ∈  (),b a n k issues ∗∗ and accepts all applications.
(2) If () 6= ∅, ˜ ()  ∗,   ∈ () and ∗∗  ∈ (),b a n k issues  and accepts all
applications.
(3) If ∗∗ ∈  (),e i t h e r  ∈  () or  is issued after ∗∗ and ˜ ()  ∗ then:
· if  =( )  ∈  () for all  ∈ [∗∗),b a n k chooses ( ) with  solving (A2)
for  = b ().
· if  =( ) ∈  () with  ∈ (∗∗),a n d  ∈  (), bank  issues  and accepts
all applications.
31(4) In all histories that are not covered in (1), (2) and (3),b a n k does not accept any
application (whatever contract it oﬀers).
We shall also assume that if an entrepreneur decides to opt out of some, but not all, the
contracts with the same repayment , he will retain those signed at the earliest stage.
Equilibrium beliefs: Banks’ beliefs at  () are common across banks and satisfy the fol-
lowing properties:
(1) For  = ∗∗,i f()=∅ or if () 6= ∅, ˜ () ≥ ∗ and neither ∗∗  ∈  () nor 
 ∈  () then  =1 .O t h e r w i s e , =0 .
(2) For  = ,i f() 6= ∅, ˜ ()  ∗,   ∈ () and ∗∗  ∈ (),t h e n =1 .
Otherwise,  =0 
(3) For  = , in all histories such that ∗∗ ∈  (),e i t h e r  ∈  () or  is issued after
∗∗ ˜ ()  ∗, then:
· if  =( )  ∈  (),w i t h ∈ [∗∗),  = ,
· if  =( ) ∈  () with  ∈ (∗∗),a n d  ∈  (),  =1 .
In all other histories  =0 .




,t h e n =0for any possible .
(5) For  =( ) with   ∗,i f = b (),t h e n =˜ ,w h e r e˜  solves (A1).
Otherwise,  =0 .
According to the above strategies only bank 1 is active, issues ∗∗ and accepts all applications.
We shall now show that these strategies maximize bank ’s expected proﬁti na n yc o n t i n u a t i o n
game, by considering in turn the cases where e () ≥ ∗ and e ()  ∗.
Case 1: 0 ≥ ∗ for all 0 .
We prove that in this case it is optimal for bank  to play according to (1): issue ∗∗ and
accept all applications if and only if no previous bank has issued ∗∗.
Let start by assuming ∗∗ ∈  ().B a n k does not obtain proﬁts from any policy ( ),
with   ∗ and   0.T h i si sb e c a u s e(1) implies 00 = ∗∗ and 00 =1for some 00 ,
while (∗∗ )  ( ∅) since   ∗∗, so that an entrepreneur taking the loan  will also
take ∗∗,t h e r e b yi n ﬂicting losses to bank . Moreover, bank  would earn zero expected proﬁt
by issuing  =( ),w i t h  ∗, and choosing   0. Were this contract issued, according
to (2) bank  +1would choose ( ),w i t h satisfying (A2). Thus, for all ,b a n k will
issue ∅, as prescribed by the equilibrium strategy. Moreover, issuing ∅ is sequentially rational
for bank , since a bank moving after  chooses
¡
 ¢
after observing that  =( ) if  ∗
is issued. Similarly, choosing
¡
 ¢
is sequentially rational at stage  +1since, were  not




Consider next the case where ∗∗  ∈  ().G i v e n(2) (3) and (4), 0 =0for all 0 .
Moreover, (1) implies + = ∅ for all 0 if  =( ∗∗),w h i l e+1 = ∗∗ if  =( ),
with  6= ∗∗.T h u s ,t h ep o l i c y( =1  ∗∗), maximizes bank ’s expected proﬁt given its beliefs.
32Finally, (1) also implies that all banks remain inactive in the continuation game starting at
stage  +1after bank  issued ∗∗. Hence, sequential rationality is satisﬁed.
Case 2: 0  ∗ for some 0 .
We prove that in this case it is optimal for bank  to play according to (2), (3) and (4):
issue either  or  depending on previous histories, or remain inactive.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which 00  ∗ for all 00  ,w i t h00 6= 0 and ∗∗  ∈  ().I n
this case according to (2) bank  issues  and accepts all applications if  6∈  (),a n dr e m a i n s
inactive otherwise. This strategy maximizes bank ’s (expected) proﬁts, because according to
equilibrium beliefs there will be no acceptances for 0 =( 0) if ∗∗  ∈ (0
), while according
to equilibrium strategies bank  +1issues  and accepts all applications if bank  has not issued
, and remains inactive otherwise. Therefore, bank  earns ( ∅) by oﬀering  and () if
it oﬀers  =( ).B u t()  ( ∅) for any since the large project is not viable, so
that  is bank ’s optimal choice. Finally, sequential rationality is satisﬁed as banks play a Nash
equilibrium in any continuation game starting at b  : any bank moving after  optimally
choose to remain inactive if bank  issued , while it strictly prefers to issue  and accept all
applications otherwise. This is true because  is the only contract that yields positive proﬁts to
bank 0 according to (2).
Consider now the case in which 00  ∗ for all 00  ,w i t h00 6= 0 ∗∗ ∈  () and
bank ’s equilibrium strategy prescribes to issue  and to accept the fraction  of applications
solving (A2) for  = 00 =( 00). Deviating from this strategy is not proﬁtable for the
following reasons. First, requiring a repayment below  =  would entail expected losses for
bank  by (A1). Second, if bank  oﬀers  ,b a n k +1will choose ( =  =1 )
according to (3).T h e nb a n k will make losses because it will attract only entrepreneurs who
already signed jointly incentive compatible contracts. Moreover, equilibrium strategies satisﬁes
sequential rationality. Indeed, in all histories where 00  ∗ for all 00  ,w i t h00 6= 0
∗∗ ∈  (), and a contract with a repayment larger than  is issued, bank  +1makes zero
proﬁt in expectation, according to (5),b yc h o o s i n g( +1 ∈ [01]) while it makes losses,
according to (3), if it issues any contract diﬀerent from  and accepts a positive fraction of
applications. By the same logic, according to (4), no bank can proﬁtably oﬀer loans, after any
h i s t o r yi nw h i c h0  ∗∗ for some 0 ,a n d and ∗∗ are both issued.
Next, consider the case where several banks charge less than ∗ before stage .B a n k then
believes that only the ﬁrst mover, among those charging less than ∗, accepts applications. The
same logic used above can be then used to prove sequential rationality at all .
Finally, for 1  3∆ the necessary and suﬃcient condition for region  to be non-empty is








This inequality is equivalent to ∆ , which is always true for   . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .We now show that, for any  ∈ ,i nr e g i o n there exists a symmetric
33PBE such that two banks are active, each issues contract  and rations the applications by
choosing randomly among applicants. The proof is developed in two steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst consider ∗∗, the contract with the highest repayment in . Suppose that
there is a PBE with the following features: () only two banks are active, say  and 0,e a c h
oﬀers ∗∗ =( ∗∗) and accepts a fraction  of its applications; () entrepreneurs who borrow
 undertake the small project, those who manage to borrow 2 undertake the large one.
The expected per-client proﬁt of each active bank is
Π()=( 1− )(∗∗ ∅)+(∗∗ ∗∗)
The ﬁrst term of Π() is bank ’s expected proﬁti fb a n k0 does not accept the entrepreneur’s
application, while the second is bank ’s expected proﬁti fb a n k0 accepts this application.
Hence, a ﬁrst step to prove the existence of a PBE satisfying ()-() is to show that Π()=0
has a solution  ∈ (01).S i n c e Π(·) is continuous and monotone in , Π(0)  0 because
 =  ≥ ∗∗  ,a n dΠ(1)  0 because the large project is unviable and (∗∗ ∗∗)  0,t h e n
equation Π()=0has a unique internal solution:
∗∗ =
(∗∗ ∅)
(∗∗ ∅) − (∗∗ ∗∗)

Step 2. We now show that there exists a zero-proﬁt PBE with the features described in step 1.
Equilibrium strategies:
Formally, bank ’s equilibrium strategy is deﬁn e db yf o u rp r o p e r t i e s(10)-(40). Property
(10) is a modiﬁed version of (1) in the proof of Proposition 2:
(10) If  ()=∅,o r () 6= ∅, ˜ () ≥ ∗, ∗∗  ∈  () and   ∈  (), or only one
bank, say 0 (with 0  ) has issued a contract up to ,a n d0 = ∗∗,t h e nb a n k issues ∗∗
and accepts applications with probability ∗∗.
Properties (20) and (30) are identical to (2) and (3) stated in the proof of Proposition 2.
Instead, (40) is stated below:
(40) If two other banks already issued contract ∗∗ before ,o ra tl e a s to n eb a n ki s s u e d∗∗
and another issued , or some bank issued  and ˜ ()  ∗,t h e nb a n k issues ∅.
Equilibrium beliefs:
Equilibrium beliefs satisfy ﬁve properties (10)-(50).P r o p e r t i e s(30) and (40) are the same
as (3) and (4) stated in the proof of Proposition 2. Instead, (10), (20) and (50) are:
(10) For  = ∗∗,i f∗∗  ∈  () and e ()  ∗, or if only one bank before  issued ∗∗
and e ()  ∗,t h e n = ∗∗. Otherwise,  =0 .
(20) For  =( ) with   ∗:
· if  = b (),  ∈  () and only one contract ∗∗ was issued before ,t h e n = e 
34where e  solves
∗∗ (1 − e )( ∗∗)+e ()+( 1− e )(1− ∗∗)( ∅)=0  (A3)
· if  = b (),  ∈  () and two banks issued ∗∗ before ,t h e n = b  where b 
solves
2∗∗ (1 − b )( ∗∗)+b ()+( 1− b )(1− ∗∗)
2 ( ∅)=0  (A4)
· otherwise,  =0 .
(50) For  = ,i fe ()  ∗ ∗∗ ∈  ()   ∈  (), and either   ∈  () or  was
issued after ∗∗,t h e n = . Otherwise,  =0 .
Note that e  ∈ (01) because 
¡
 ∗∗¢
 0,s i n c e∗∗ and  are both contained in  and
    ∗∗. By the same token, also b  ∈ (01).
Going through the same logical steps used to prove Proposition 2, the above strategies and
beliefs can be shown to identify a PBE. These steps are omitted for brevity. These arguments
can also be extended to show that for any  ∈ , there exists a rationing equilibrium where two
banks are active and symmetrically oﬀer  by choosing randomly among applicants. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. All rationing equilibria satisfy the following zero-proﬁt condition:
()+( 1− )(∅)=0 ,






 +( 1− )
(∅)

 () − (∅)

where the numerator is positive because a higher repayment (weakly) increases proﬁts in all
states, and the denominator is negative because ()  0 and (∅)  0 for  ∈ . Hence,
  0. To complete the proof, note that if applicants who obtain two loans default in both
states, the default probability is  = 2
£
2(1 − )+2¤
, while it is 2 if they default in the
bad state only. Since   0, in both cases the default probability is increasing in . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .We start by showing that in the region under consideration there is a
zero-proﬁt PBE where one bank issues the monopoly contract  and accepts a fraction   1
of applicants, two banks issue the usurious contract  =( ) with    and accept a
fraction of applicants   1, while the remaining banks stay inactive. In this equilibrium, each
entrepreneur applies to all active banks and, when his applications are accepted by all active
banks, he retains the contract  and drops one of the two usurious contracts by randomizing
with equal probability. For convention, we shall assume that bank 1 issues  and bank 2 and




( ∅)+( 2 ( 1− ) +( )2)( )
i
=0  (A5)


















where the left-hand-side of (A5) is the expected proﬁto fb a n k1, earning ( ∅)  0 on the
fraction (1 − )2 of clients whose applications for  are refused and ( )  0 on the
fraction (2(1 − ) +
¡
¢2) of clients who obtain at least one acceptance for . Similarly,











0 on the fraction
¡
1 − ¢
 of clients who sign at least another usurious contract. It is
straightforward to verify that (A5) and (A6) have a unique solution (∗ ∗) ∈ (01)2.F i n a l l y ,









the proﬁt per loan that a bank earns if it oﬀers  =( ) with  ∈ (), provided that
another bank issues  and accepts the fraction  of applicants, two other banks issue  and
accept the fraction  of applicants, and the remaining banks stay inactive. In the following,
we shall prove that there exists a PBE supported by the following strategies and beliefs.
Strategies: Entrepreneur  applies for all contracts; if only one bank, say bank , accepts his
application, he uses this loan to fund investment if and only  ≤ , otherwise he drops this
loan; if two or more of his applications are accepted, entrepreneur  retains only two of the loans
with the lowest contractual repayments, by randomizing with equal probability between loans
with identical repayment.
Banks’ strategies have the following features:
(1) If   ∈  (),b a n k issues  and accepts the fraction ∗ of applications; if
 ∈  () and at most one bank has oﬀered  before ,b a n k issues  and accepts the
fraction ∗ of applications.
(2) If  ∈  (),  ∈  () and has been issued by at least two banks, bank  issues 0
such that Π(0)=0and accepts all applications when some contract  such that Π()  0
was already issued.
(3) In all other histories, bank  remains inactive.
Beliefs: Equilibrium beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies. Moreover, each bank
believes that any deviating competitor refuses all applications.
Consider ﬁrst a bank that deviates by issuing  =( ) with  ∈ () at some stage .
According to equilibrium beliefs () and competitors’ equilibrium strategies, this bank earns
the expected proﬁt per loan Π(;())=( 1− ∗)(0). This deviation is unproﬁtable,
36i.e.,  (0)  0, because: ﬁrst, by construction 0 (the break-even repayment conditional
on no default in the good state); second, an entrepreneur signing ˆ  =(  ˆ ) with ˆ from
two banks (and undertaking the large project) must default in both states, since otherwise both
banks would make zero proﬁts, contradicting the assumption that the large project is unviable,
implying (0 0)  0;t h i r d , will also induce default in both states, if taken jointly with 0,
since  0,i m p l y i n g (0)  0
Moreover, no bank can proﬁtably oﬀer a rate  ∈ ()∪(∞). Indeed, given competitors’
strategies and its own beliefs, any bank oﬀering 0 =( 0) with 0   earns an expected proﬁt
per loan Π(0; ()) equal to
(1 − )(1 − )2(0 0)+(0 )+( 1− )(2 − )(0 )
One can easily verify that Π(0; ())  Π1 =0 . In addition, given competitors’ strate-
gies, a bank oﬀering 00 =( 00) with 00  , earns the expected proﬁt per loan:
Π(0; ())=(1 − )2(00 )+( 1− )2(1 − )(00 )
Again, it is easy to check that Π(00; ())  Π2 =0 . Thus, banks’ and entrepreneurs’
strategies deﬁne a Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that no bank can
proﬁtably deviate by issuing a contract  =( ) with  ∈ [).
Moreover, banks’ strategies are sequentially rational because, after any history, the continu-
ation game starting at  has a PBE where all banks use equilibrium strategies, given that banks
moving after  hold equilibrium beliefs.
To complete the proof, it remains to be shown that () there is no PBE satisfying A6 in
which all funded entrepreneurs undertake the small project and () there is a PBE where no
entrepreneur is funded. Both these results are immediate. First, in any equilibrium candidate
where all entrepreneurs undertake the small project, a deviating bank would earn a strictly
positive proﬁt by issuing 0 =( 0) with 0 =  +  and 0, provided no other bank
accepts applications. This implies that A6 c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed in any equilibrium where some
entrepreneurs are funded and they all undertake the small project. Second, in the region under
consideration there is an equilibrium with market freeze, supported by the following banks’
strategies: for any ,b a n k issues  and accepts all applications whenever  has not been issued
before  and remains inactive otherwise. Moreover, as in this region    =  because
even the monopoly contract  6∈ , no entrepreneur will sign  if only one bank oﬀers this
contract and all other banks remain inactive. The details of these proofs are straightforward
and therefore are omitted.
Finally, for 1  3∆ the necessary and suﬃcient condition for region  to be non-empty is








37This inequality is equivalent to ∆
2. ¥
Remark: under information sharing banks may condition their acceptances to the entrepre-
neur’s past credit history, i.e., his total indebtedness and its breakdown across loans. Taking
this into account requires some additional notation: bank  conditions the acceptance of a loan
application to the pre-existing set of contracts ˆ (), which applicants signed and did not opt
out before stage . For instance, ˆ ()=∅ means that bank  only accepts applications from
entrepreneurs with zero debt. Moreover, let () be the set of contracts that entrepreneur 
actually signed up to stage  −1, and from which he did not opt out before applying to bank .
Proof of Proposition 6. We shall ﬁrst prove existence and then uniqueness.
Existence. We show that, with information sharing, in the region of parameters 0 ∪ 0 there
exists a SPNE where only bank 1 is active and issues ∗, all entrepreneurs borrow from this
bank and undertake the small project. Showing this is equivalent to proving that in region 0
there is a competitive and eﬃcient equilibrium, since from the proof of Proposition 2 ∗ = 
for  ≤ 0 (). Consider the following strategies:
() Banks’ strategies:
(1) bank 1 issues ∗ and accepts all applications for this contract;
(2) for any history  where all contracts issued at 0 charged repayments 0 ≥ ∗,
bank  issues ∗ and accepts entrepreneur ’s application if and only if (−1)=∅ or this
entrepreneur opted out of all pre-existing contracts before applying for ;
(3) for any history  such that some bank has previously oﬀered a contract with repayment
e () below ∗,b a n k issues  and accepts applications by entrepreneurs who signed at most
one contract requiring a repayment below ∗.
() Entrepreneurs’ strategies:
(1) for any possible previous history, entrepreneurs apply for all contracts;
(2) the entrepreneur  accepts a new contract  and retains a previously accepted contract
ˆ  that bank  does not require him to drop, if and only if the pair (ˆ ) makes him better
oﬀ than any other pair of contracts (0 00) that he already signed. Formally, he opts out of
all the previously accepted contracts contained in (−1) but not in ˆ () and applies for
contract  if and only if (ˆ )  (0 00),f o rs o m eˆ  ∈ ˆ () ∪ {∅} and for all pairs (0 00)
in (−1) ∪ {∅},p r o v i d e d ˆ () ⊆ (−1);
(3) if instead the entrepreneur  has not previously signed any contract ˆ  required by bank
,i . e . , ˆ () * (−1), he retains all the previously accepted contracts.
Consider ﬁrst bank 1’s deviations. Bank 1 cannot increase its proﬁts by charging a repayment
amount below ∗, since according to equilibrium strategies all entrepreneurs would accept such a
new oﬀer and never out of it. Bank 1 cannot increase its proﬁts by charging a higher repayment
38either, because such an oﬀer would be successfully undercut: given (2),b a n k2 would issue
2 = ∗ and accept all applications of entrepreneurs with no debt at the application stage.
Next, after bank 1 issues ∗, no subsequent bank can proﬁtably deviate. First, no other
bank can gain by issuing a contract requiring a repayment larger than ∗,b e c a u s eb y(2)
entrepreneurs will never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sign such a contract. Second, no bank 1 can
g a i nb yi s s u i n gac o n t r a c t =( ),w i t h  ∗:i fi td i ds o ,a c c o r d i n gt o(3) a third bank
would oﬀer the zero-proﬁt contract , the entrepreneur would be better oﬀ by bundling  and
, and dropping ∗.A s a r e s u l t , b a n k  would make losses, because the entrepreneur would
undertake the unviable project and the bank that oﬀered  makes zero proﬁts (by deﬁnition of
).
For any history  where 0 =( 0),w i t h0 ≥ ∗ for all 0 ,b a n k’s strategy, which
prescribes to oﬀer ∗ at ,s a t i s ﬁes perfection since by (3) an entrepreneur will only retain
the ﬁrst one of several identical contracts that he signed. Next, consider an history  such
that e ()  ∗ where e () is the contract with the lowest repayment in  (). Then, the
strategy of all banks moving after  prescribes to oﬀer  =  and accept applications from all
entrepreneurs who have taken only one loan with repayment lower than ∗. These strategies,
given (3), are part of a perfect equilibrium in the subgame starting at .B y t h es a m e l o g i c ,
subgame perfection holds for all .
Finally, consider possible deviations by entrepreneurs. Since banks’ strategies condition ac-
ceptances only on the set of contracts that entrepreneurs accepted and did not drop, and not on
their entire history of applications and acceptances, and since entrepreneurs can always opt out
of previous loan contracts if optimal, they are always better oﬀ accepting all the available loan
oﬀers. Hence, (1) and (2) imply that entrepreneurs’ strategies are sequentially rational at any
, since, according to the equilibrium strategies, dropping a contract at  never prevents an en-
trepreneur from accepting new proﬁtable deals after given that banks follow their equilibrium
strategies from  on.
Uniqueness. We now show that the SPNE characterized in step 1 is unique in 0 ∪ 0.F i r s t ,
there cannot be a SPNE where some entrepreneurs sign the contract  =( ),w i t h  ∗
at .T h i sc a nb ee a s i l yv e r i ﬁed in region 0 where ∗ = . Consider instead region 0.I nt h i s
region bank  issuing  =( ),w i t h  ∗, makes losses in any subgame after  is issued.
This is because according to A6 some bank moving after  will issue either  or 0 =(  + )
with  such that (0 ) ( ∅), and accept applications by entrepreneurs with contract .
Second, there cannot be a SPNE where some entrepreneurs sign  =( ),w i t h  ∗,a t
and undertake the small project: this is because contract  can be safely undercut by a cheaper
and jointly incentive compatible contract. Finally, it is immediate that in region 0 ∪ 0 there
cannot exist a SPNE where some entrepreneurs are excluded from credit: since ∗ is jointly
i n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l e ,t h ec o n t r a c tc h a r g i n g∗   is proﬁtable and makes the entrepreneur
better oﬀ than with no borrowing. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst prove existence and then uniqueness.
39Existence. We prove that there is a no-trade SPNE equilibrium where agents’ strategies satisfy
the following properties.
() Banks’ strategies:
For any possible sequence of contracts issued up to ,b a n k issues  and accepts the
application of entrepreneur  if and only if this entrepreneur has signed only one contract with
repayment lower or equal the monopoly repayment .
() Entrepreneurs’ strategies are the same as in the proof of Proposition 6.
We start by proving existence. Consider ﬁrst banks’ deviations. First, suppose that bank
 issues  =( ) with  ∈ () and accepts applications from entrepreneurs with zero
total indebtedness at  (for whom ˆ ()=∅); this bank makes losses given competitors’
strategies. This is because all entrepreneurs who sign  will also succeed in obtaining  from
some other bank moving after , and in this region they will actually prefer to take both 
and  and invest in the large and unviable project. Second, bank  cannot proﬁtably deviate by
issuing any contract  =( ) and accepting applications only from entrepreneurs who already
signed one or more contracts. This is because, according to the banks’ equilibrium strategy, no
entrepreneur will be able to sign any contract before  is oﬀered. Thus, bank  will end up
making zero proﬁts. Moreover, banks’ strategies are part of a perfect equilibrium: indeed, for
any history such that no contract has been oﬀered up to , any contract  that entrepreneurs
accept according to their equilibrium strategy generate losses for bank .
Consider next the entrepreneurs: proving that their strategies are sequentially rational at
all stages follows the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 6.
Uniqueness. Suppose there is a SPNE in which a subset of entrepreneurs is funded. For
all banks to at least break even, these entrepreneurs must get a loan of size  and undertake
the small project. If so, entrepreneurs’ rationality requires that they will accept a contract
 =( ) with  ∈ []. But in this region any of such contracts violates joint incentive
compatibility. In particular, ()  ( ∅),a n d will be issued by some other bank moving
after  according to A6, since it is jointly incentive compatible and hence entails no losses.
Therefore, contract  makes losses, and no bank will accept applications for it, i.e.,  will not
be oﬀered in equilibrium. ¥
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430    
Contracting process at each stage  (0, ]   : 
 bank b =   posts a loan contract; 
 entrepreneurs apply for loans, 
 bank b =   accepts or refuses applications.
    1    
Investment stage: 
funded entrepreneurs 
choose small or 
large project. 




 value of wealth 
and project returns 
are realized, 
 loans are repaid or 
default occurs. 
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Figure 5. Equilibria with information sharing and seniority-based liquidation
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